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Spatially-allocated concessions with limited-duration ownership are increasingly employed to manage natural resources in many countries, yet they have received little attention from economists. Motivated by settings such as territorial user right fisheries (TURFs), we develop a model to analyze the effects of spatial concessions with limited tenure. The resource migrates
around the system and thus induces a spatial externality, so complete decentralization into spatial property rights will not solve the tragedy of the commons. We analyze a system in which concessions can be renewed, but only if their owners maintain resource stocks above a pre-defined target. We show that this instrument improves upon the decentralized property right solution and can replicate (under general conditions) the socially optimal extraction path in every patch, in perpetuity. The duration of tenure and the dispersal of the resource play pivotal roles in whether this instrument achieves the socially optimal outcome, and sustains cooperation of all concessionaires.
