Programme > Papiers par auteur > Querou Nicolas

Limited-tenure concessions in a patchy system
Nicolas Querou  1@  , Christopher Costello  2@  , Agnes Tomini  3@  
1 : Center for Environmental Economics - Montpellier  (CEE-M)  -  Site web
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS
2 Place Pierre Viala, bat 26, 34060 Montpellier Cedex 2 -  France
2 : Bren School, University California Santa Barbara
3 : Aix-Marseille School of Economics

Spatially-allocated concessions with limited-duration ownership are increasingly employed to manage natural resources in many countries, yet they have received little attention from economists. Motivated by settings such as territorial user right fisheries (TURFs), we develop a model to analyze the effects of spatial concessions with limited tenure. The resource migrates
around the system and thus induces a spatial externality, so complete decentralization into spatial property rights will not solve the tragedy of the commons. We analyze a system in which concessions can be renewed, but only if their owners maintain resource stocks above a pre-defined target. We show that this instrument improves upon the decentralized property right solution and can replicate (under general conditions) the socially optimal extraction path in every patch, in perpetuity. The duration of tenure and the dispersal of the resource play pivotal roles in whether this instrument achieves the socially optimal outcome, and sustains cooperation of all concessionaires.

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